The second enlargement of the EEC in historical perspective by Seers, Dudley
f o r  f t  ooc. IQ  A
DISCUSSION PAPER
Preliminary m aterial and interim research results circulated  
to stim ulate discussion and critical comment
The Second Enlargement o f the EEC 
in Historical Perspective 
by Dudley Seers 
D P  158 February 1981
INTERNAT TONAL/DEFENDFNi :K






The paper suggests that the European Economic Community 
can only be understood in its historical context, as an 
attempt to recreate the dominant position of Western 
Europe in the colonial system - able to obtain the food, 
raw materials and fuel its needs to maintain its economy 
and thus its parliamentary system, high .wages, etc. To 
do that requires now a grouping of nations, with a varied 
resource base and a large market, not merely to achieve 
technological supremacy but also to bargain successfully.
The Second Enlargement, like the First, is logical from 
this point of view, though it raises more sharply than 
before the question of how viable an economic zone is, in 
the long term, if it allows big inequalities to persist 
or even grow. The momentum of enlargement raises a question 
about the possibility of a Third Enlargement to cover, at 
first informally, part of Eastern Europe too.
* This paper will form the Introduction to The Second 
Enlargement of the EEC: Integration of Unequal Partners, 
edited by Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos, Macmi1lan 
(forthcoming 1981). When chapter numbers are cited in the 
text, they refer to this volume.
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1INTRODUCTION
It would be a mistake to discuss the enlargement of the.EEC 
simply in terms of the addition of three more members.
We need to see how this fits into the changing pattern of the 
Community, past and prospective, and to do that we have to 
go back to its origin, as an attempt to recreate European 
prosperity and influence in the second half of the twentieth 
century.
Let us start, in fact, further back with a very brief, and t 
thus over-simplified, survey of the main features of European 
ascendency in the colonial period: although these are well-
known, we need to recall them if we are to understand the 
issues raised by the enlargement. The technological leader­
ship, first of Britain, joined by France and later others, 
made it possible to create a world system in which the 
manufactures of the leading countries of Western Europe 
were exchanged for foodstuffs and materials that were 
considerably cheaper than those produced at home. The 
development of primary production overseas was also directly 
profitable because much of the capital and expertise for 
plantations and mines (and for related systems of railways 
and docks) also originated in Europe, so profits and interests 
flowed homewards, as did payments for insurance and freight. 
These beneficial patterns of trade, services and investment 
were cemented by cultural links (including the use of the 
English and French languages) and safeguarded by coloniai 
political systems (ultimately by military power). Western 
Europe was, moreover, self-sufficient than in the main source 
of energy, coal.
As always for technological leaders, laissez faire was the 
appropriate doctrine. On this economic base, an inter­
national economic order could be established with considerable 
freedom of trade and currency convertibility through the gold 
standard. The 'rules' of this order compelled the colonies 
(and weaker independent countries) to open their economise 
up and follow, automatically, economic changes in the big 
industrial countries - for exsmple, suffering slumps whenever 
they did.
The hegemony enjoyed by Britain and France, in particular, 
permitted rising wages at home, a considerable expansion of 
social services, the development of trade unions and 
strengthening of parliamentary democracy - four trends which 
reinforced each other. The expanding fiscal system,
1. I am grateful to the following for comments on drafts 
(though none should be held in any way responsible for 
the final version): Manfred Bienfeld, Philip Mishalani,
Stefan Musto, Marja-Liisa Kiljunen, Constantine Vaitsos. 
Philip Mishalani also helped with the basic research.
2together with deliberate policy initiatives, transferred 
funds not only from the rich to the poor, but also from more 
advanced refions to those that temained backward. The 
consequent growth of internal markets, together with the 
expansion of international trade, enabled the industrialists 
to take full advantage of economies of scale and reap profits 
which could be reinvested to sustain the momentum of 
technological advance: this in turn permitted a consolid­
ation of the cultural, political and military pillars of 
hegemony.
In retrospect, while the pattern of progress was coherent, 
it was precarious. Consumers in the metropolitan countries, 
working class as well as middle and upper, became accustomed 
to life styles which were opulent by international standards. 
Since these involved heavy bills for imports of food and 
materials, the whole system was vulnerable to overseas 
policies of import substitution or nationalisation, which 
were only inhibited by colonial rule.l It was even more 
exposed to the emergence of any countries that could 
challenge the imperial powers.
Even at the turn of the century, the United States economy 
was starting to produce substitutes for imports from Europe 
and to compete with European exports in third markets, 
with the help of cheap and willing immigrant labour. Still, 
fortunately for Western Europe, this emerging economy could 
advance by internal expansion: it had the space to develop
its own food supplies and enjoyed vast untapped mineral 
resources.
A much more serious threat came from within Western Europe 
itself. The benefits of European hegemony were not spread 
at all evenly across the continent. They accrued mainly to 
the early industrialisers, especially Britain, the earliest, 
and the one with the largest and richest empire. In the 
countries without colonies, wages remained low, social 
services meagre, trade unions weak and political systems 
mostly authoritarian. In particular, as Lenin pointed out, 
a major disproportion arose between, on the one hand, the 
industrial capacity of Germany, and, on the other, its 
overseas markets and investment opportunities, and, therefore,
1. The local rich, who had mostly been educated in Europe 
(or in European-style universities) and knew the style 
of life of the European middle classes, had developed 
tastes for European products, but many of them, 
especially the new graduates of local universities, 
lacked spectacular employment prospects and resented 
second-class status.
3its international influence and internal living standards. 
After all the doctrine of laissez faire was not so pure 
that the imperial governments which preached it felt impelled 
to open up their colonies. The German response was In part 
a policy of protected and guided industrialisation (with the 
blessing of List), in part external expansion. The two 
world wars which originated, and were mainly centred, in 
Europe should be seen, not as the work of two individual 
adventurers but as national attempts to wrest hegemony 
from the older imperial powers.
Although the latter 'won' they were seriously weakened.
They were unable to reverse, after the first war, the 
Communist revolution in Russia. Moreover, the effort to 
sustain in the inter-war period the whole colonial system 
(now beginning to be challenged also by Japan), including a 
re-established gold standard, aggravated the depression in 
Britain and France and weakened their economies, involving 
priority for the military superstructure at the expense of 
the industrial base. Even so, their military strength 
proved inadequate. In the first war, German imperialism 
had been defeated very largely by British and French forces: 
in the second, France collapsed at an early stage, and major 
roles were played by the Soviet Union and the United States. 
After the first, only the Austrian and Russian Empires had 
disintegrated:1 following the second, none of them survived 
and Britain and France were jointly humiliated in the Suez 
crisis of 1956.
The wars had stimulated the tide of nationalism in Africa 
and Asia and provided opportunities for industrialisation 
elsewhere, especially in Latin America. Following the 
advance of the Red Army in 1945, Communist regimes were 
installed in Eastern Europe, cutting it off politically and 
economically from the West. Productive capacity in Western 
Europe had, moreover, been reduced by bombing, and inventories 
of all types were very low. Britain and France became 
dependent economically and militarily on the United States, 
a country which now had its own interest in opening the 
colonial empires to international competition and establishing 
a worldwide arena for its clear technological superiority.
The US administration established (at Bretton Woods) a 
system of convertible currencies at fixed exchange rates, 
with rules in some ways similar to those of the gold standard, 
but based on the dollar.
1. Though the Russian one was recreated with the help of 
egalitarian rhetoric. (It is beyond the scope of 
this paper to investigate the realities of Its 
implementation).
4The First Two Decades of the EEC
The original aims of the European Economic Community lie 
rooted in this history. The most urgent objective of its 
founders were to prevent any more German attempts to snatch 
hegemony by force, and to check the penetration of Russian 
influence in Western Europe. In these aims it naturally 
had the support of the US government, which welcomed the 
Community's birth. But there was also a more far- 
reaching objective, to catch up in technological terms and 
re-establish the economic foundations of hegemony and thus 
of comfortable life styles and parliamentary democracy, 
without relying on the United States.
Such an aim was hardly any longer conceivable for individual 
European countries in the second half of the twentieth 
centure, but a 'third force', capable of 'continuous expan­
sion' , in the words of the Speak Report,1 did not look 
implausible on the basis of the combined resources and markets 
of sic countries with a total population larger than that of 
Japan. Ultimately, the Community would, it was hoped, 
advance to a high degree of economic and institutional 
integration, including a monetary union and a common defence 
force, eventually a political union.
The founders also intended that the Community would be a 
laissez falre system. This would ensure that its indust- 
rial structures were made more efficient by exposure to 
competition, and contribute to the re-establishment of 
international free trade, which was an essential element in 
this neo-colonial scenario. Moreover, institutional laissez 
faire would make it difficult for any really left-wing 
government of the future to exercise controls and carry out 
far-reaching social changes (as appeared, at the time, a real 
possibility in France and Italy).
In the 1960s, all the immediate political and economic 
objectives seemed to have been brilliantly secured. The 
Treaty of Rome had consolidated Germany's post-war partition 
by integrating the economy of the western sectors with those 
of France and the other founding members. Military power 
had been not only eliminated but forgotten as a means of 
settling disputes within the Community, and armed forces
1. See 'The EEC and the World Economy' ' by Geoffrey <•
Barraclough, Integration and Unequal Development; The 
Experience of the E E C , eds. Dudley Seers and Constantine 
Vaitsos, (Macmillan, 1980).
5were no longer needed for defence against West European 
neighbours. Soviet territorial expansion had been 
contained (though with considerable assistance from the 
United States, eg, over Berlin) as had the rise of the 
French and Italian Communist Parties. Economic growth 
was fast, raising living standards well above even pre-war 
levels. Although the Community's Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) became increasingly autarchic, the low external 
tariff on manufactures, together with internal free trade, 
continued to demonstrate the economic liberalism of the 
Community's founders. Moreover, the CAP had one great 
merit: it raised the degree of self-sufficiency in food,
and thus reduced dependence on the outside world - whatever 
one may think of either the equity or the efficiency of the 
instruments employed. To a considerable extent the old 
colonial economic links were preserved, or re-established.
There is no way, however, of knowing how much the attainment 
of these objectives was due to the Treaty of Rome.
Economic growth had accelerated to a fast rate long before 
the Community was founded. It was facilitated afterwards 
not merely by the continued expansion of the world economy 
but also by a heavy inflow of labourers from the 
Mediterranean area who took on unattractive jobs and helped 
restrain wage increases; they would have come to Western 
Europe anyway.
It was not the Community as such which re-established 
colonial-type patterns of trade and investment but its 
member governments and the transnational enterprises (TNEs). 
Most of the newly-independent governments overseas, 
especially in Africa, acquiesced (to a degree) in this.
It was the only way their leaders could retain the European 
life styles to which they had grown accustomed and which 
the TNEs were reinforcing. European governments had 
helped to power those sections of the nationalist movement 
they considered cooperative, especially in countries with 
rich mineral resources, and were assisting them subsequently. 
On occasion, especially in Africa, troops were used, but 
the main means now had to be financial aid and technical 
assistance.
Even during the negotiations leading up to the Community's 
first enlargement, which substantially increased the market 
and its resource base, world economic conditions continued 
to be favourable. However, as that enlargement approached, 
the boom was already running out of steam. Britain,
Denmark, and Ireland were admitted on the eve of an economic 
crisis which had been heralded by the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates (a sign of 
weakening hegemony), and was triggered by the fast rise in 
oil prices at the end of 1973.
6The rise in productivity in the industries of Western 
Europe was slowing down, and the difficulties they now faced, 
especially older ones such as shipbuilding, steel, textiles, 
and clothing, were aggravated by increasing competition not 
merely from Japan but also the 'newly industrialising 
countries' (NICs), which had been attracting heavy TNE 
investment. Moreover, import-substituting industrial­
isation was growing throughout the Third World. On the 
other hand, even in Western Europe itself, some of the 
dynamic new sectors, especially electronics (including 
micro-processors) were dominated by TNEs based in Japan and 
the United States.
The weaknesses in European industry have been aggravated by 
a fundamental inconsistency between the Community's 
autarchic policies for agriculture and its lalssez faire 
aspirations for industry. It is not easy to achieve a 
fast expansion of industrial exports, or avoid penetration 
of domestic markets, if trade union demands, anyway strong, 
are stimulated by high prices for what is still the most 
important wage good, f o o d . 2  (Have we forgotten so complet­
ely the stimulus provided to British industry by the repeal 
of the Corn Laws that we expect to have no effects on 
unprotected European industries the Community's price 
supports for cereals and other farm products?)
Such support, especially in the livestock sector (during a 
period of economic stagnation), also created embarrassing 
physical surpluses and placed a heavy financial burden on 
its budget, inhibiting the growth of social and regional 
expenditure, which would have assisted industrial restruc­
turing. Very little money indeed was available,either, for 
the vital sector of energy. Moreover, the severe crisis in 
1980 over the net contribution of Britain, the least
1. Actually the total penetration by the NICs is so far 
not very great. See 'The Changing International 
Division of Labour in Manufactured Goods', World Bank 
Staff Working Paper no 329, 1979.
2. US manufacturers have not only benefited from cheap 
food, but also from controls on the price of domestic­
ally-produced oil. <■
7agricultural of the Nine, diverted policy discussion away 
from the fundamental problems - how the Community economy 
was to survive in a world gradually becoming more compet­
itive arid, of a sudden, politically quite menacing.
The problem was in part exported:^ barriers were erected 
arounded the Community to protect not only agriculture, but 
now also the traditional Industries mentioned above. The 
EEC's effective rates of protection are now higher than 
those of the United States and broadly comparable with 
Japan. The Community has also made more use of health 
regulations, variable duties and quantitative restrictions 
(ie 'non-tariff barriers') than either of its two main 
competitors. A Community cartel has in effect been 
created in steel. Community subsidies are being used to 
assist European electronic and communication Industries to 
catch up those of Japan and the United States.
It is now clear that the aspirations of the Community's 
founders to recreate technological leadership have not 
really succeeded, apart from a few industries (mainly In 
West Germany). So economic liberalism has been largely 
abandoned in reality - if not yet in the Community's 
rhetoric. Instead, the Community's bargaining muscle, which 
is a function of economic size, has been used increasingly 
to contain the penetration of European industrial markets 
by Japan and the NICs.
The Community has played a growing role in shoring up the 
colonial patterns of trade and investment. While in its 
first decade, aid and trade policies were almost entirely 
bilateral, the Community has been gradually taking these 
over, institutionalising them in the Lome agreements, and 
negotiating special treaties with Mediterranean countries.
Integration has in fact yielded benefits in external policy 
not envisaged at the outset - at least until political
1. See Manfred Bienefeld in Seers et al, op cit, which 
discusses the 'externalisation' of the Community's 
problems.
2. See a paper on industrial protection by Pedro Mendive 
(CEPAL Review, no 10, 1980). However non-tariff 
barriers of other kinds - eg language and personal 
contacts - successfully insulate the Japanese market 
from any foreiqn competition that might threaten 
penetration.
8union had been achieved. Statements have also been issued 
on the Community's own position on political issues such as 
Southern Africa, Iran, Afghanistan and Palestine and it is 
represented as such at 'summit' meetings. The 'Conference 
of Foreign Ministers,speaks on its behalf to the European 
Parliament, United Nations, etc.
The Background to the Second Enlargement
In the mid-1970s, there seemed no great difficulty about 
accepting Greece, Portugal and Spain into the Community.
The second enlargement would indeed help achieve the orig­
inal economic and political objectives: a still bigger
market would be created, whereas to reject their applic­
ations would stimulate the Communist forces evidently 
alive in each of them. The Nine had digested the rise in 
oil prices from 1973 to 1975 with surprisingly little 
difficulty. They provided much of the new import needs 
of the Arab oil exporters, and their money markets success­
fully 'recycled' most of the considerable quantity of 
foreign exchange which the latter could not spend. After 
a brief check, economic growth was resumed.
However, satisfaction over the resumption of economic 
growth was premature. At the end of 1978, following the 
revolution in Iran, oil prices soared again, testing the 
flexibility of the economies of the Community once more, 
and more profoundly. Really only that of West Germany 
passed the test. It is now clear that in other members, 
especially Britain, institutions and attitudes still reflect 
the former type of hegemony. It has been possible for 
rigidities to linger on in both capital and labour markets, 
for unenterprising management to survive, and for trade 
unions to resist innovation and redeployment and simultan­
eously to demand ever-rising levels of living. The 
steadily growing unemployment and chronic inflation in the 
Nine (see Table 1) are symptoms of social structures that 
are fossils from the colonial period.
There are therefore historical reasons for expecting the 
1980s to be a difficult decade for Western Europe. In 
addition, it is doubtful whether world trade in oil will be
1. The O'Kennedy Report (October 1979) summarised progress 
in this field.
9maintained at current levels, even if there is no major war. 
Consequently, industrial output in Western Europe may well 
show little net rise over the decades ahead. The prospects 
would be brighter if an alternative life style, less 
materialistic and thus less energy-intensive, were adopted, 
as advocated by Jose Luis Sampedro, but at present this is 
still very much a minority taste (cultivated in the face of 
heavy pressures of salesmanship).
Tensions with the rest of the world, including 'developing’ 
countries, are growing. The energy constraint, in conjunc­
tion with a still rapidly rising world population, is turning 
the world economic contest into almost a zero-sum game.
This is being played with increasing ferocity. The first 
generation of post-colonial political leaders and officials 
in Africa and Asia is being replaced by a new cohort who are 
more acutely aware of historic grievances and determined 
that they will not remain the world game's biggest losers.
This is the rather unhelpful context of the negotiations 
over the applications of Greece, Portugal and Spain to join 
the Community. One thing we soon noticed in our work is 
that the implications of the enlargement have not been 
properly studied, or even widely appreciated, in either the 
existing members or the new ones. In the former, some 
groups are aware of how the enlargement may affect their 
immediate material interests - farmers, for example, 
producing 'Mediterranean' products. Others hope for allies 
in the dogfights of Community politics. 1) Hardly anybody, 
however, except perhaps in West Germany2)has grasped the 
magnitude of the project. Still fewer are ready for the 
short-term sacrifices that would integrate Western Europe 
for the longer term. On the other hand, few realise the 
potential advantages. Not only would the Community 
market be bigger; the population would be younger, with 
a high proportion of those more capable of adjusting to 
political changes and to the rapidly shifting pattern of 
the demand for labour.3)
1. See Chapter 2 by Christian Deubner.
2. See the work of the German Development Institute, 
referred to in the Chapter by Stefan Musto.
3. It would also not have to face the prospect of 
population decline. By 1977, the average completed 
family size had already declined below the replacement 
level (2.1) for all the existing members of the EEC 
(except Ireland). (People, vol 7 no 1, IFPF, London, 
1980, based on estimates by Institut National d'Etudes 
Demographiques, Paris).
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In the Three, when the applications were made, the just­
ifications appeared vague and largely speculative: member­
ship would 'reinforce democracy' or 'strengthen free enter­
prise". Such beliefs hardly seemed a sufficient basis 
for a step which involved a considerable sacrifice of 
sovereignty. Here too the social and economic require­
ments of full integration are still only dimly appreciated.
While the applicants have certain dynamic industries, 
especially Spain, able to penetrate more deeply the markets 
of the Nine, parts of their manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors are hardly capable of.survival inside the Community. 
(See Payno et al forthcoming. ) The shock of joining 
could well strengthen, not weaken, authoritarian tendencies.
enlargement comes at a time when the Community's instit­
utions are evidently in need of reform, when many of its own 
industries need considerable structural change to become 
competitive on world markets and when its economy is stagnant.
"The crisis of the Community is likely to become the central 
issue of the southern enlargement and not the other way 
round " . ^
On top of this, the enlargement also reinforces the already 
pressing need for a redefinition of the Community's role 
vis-a-vis non-members, especially the 'developing' countries. 
The Community has already in some ways damaged their 
interests. The implications of the enlargement for the 
Arab countries of the Mediterranean, the ACP states and the 
Asian NICs, are that extending concessions to the new 
members will entail withdrawing them from parts of the 
Third World. Examples are provided by manufactures such 
as textiles and steel, farm products such as wine and olives. 
The more migrants enter the Nine from the Three, the fewer 
will come from elsewhere. The more West European capital 
is invested or lent in the new members, the less will be 
available for the Third World.
Here again, the task is simply a bigger version of one that 
faces the Community anyway - finding ways of reconciling 
the fundamental needs of Western Europe with those in 
'developing countries'. The problems of the latter are not 
merely pressing on humanitarian grounds; markets and
1. The Second Enlargement of the EEC: The Prospective
New Members; Macmillan, forthcoming.
2. See Francois Duchene in Chapter 2.
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sources of materials are essential to a continent with an 
economic structure shaped in the colonial period. Indeed, 
precisely because basic foodstuffs and energy have become so 
expensive in the Community, its industries more than ever 
need continued access to cheap sources of another major 
determinant of industrial costs, raw materials. The 
practical dilemma facing the EEC is how to reconcile the 
maintenance of such access with the protection of West 
European industrial output and employment. The balance 
of Interest is, moreover, not identical for all its members: 
the West German government is primarily concerned with 
keeping foreign markets open, a British government of any 
kind must give a heavy weight to the problems of precarious 
industries at home.
In the absence of Community leadership, member governments 
will no doubt set up national barriers to protect employ­
ment in sensitive industries, make their own trading 
arrangements - and raise difficulties over the admission 
of Spain. The French government, in particular, shows 
signs already of taking this route, with its bilateral 
Middle East deals and the presidential references to the
problems posed by Spanish entry.
A Community Enlarged but Unchanged?
As pointed out above, social contrasts have been mitigated,
up to a point, within each of the Nine over the past century,
largely through the growing power of fiscal systems that 
depended on the economic benefits of West European hegemony. 
However, the Community itself has conspicuously failed so 
far to reduce the inequalities in the Nine. The standard 
of living in, say, Sicily continues to be very far removed 
from that in Hamburg, more so in many respects than when 
the Community was founded. The concentration of economic 
power now seems in some ways comparable to that in the 
Hapsburg Empire, where it was one of the causes of the 
latter's downfall. Unemployment is especially high in 
peripheral areas. The Community's founders, being deeply 
conservative, did not see the need for a strong fiscal 
system, which might have been easier to wrest from member 
governments in the early, dynamic years. The tacit assump­
tion was that the profits of growth would 'trickle down' 
sufficiently to solve regional problems, a proposition for 
the most part discredited in other continents, and obviously 
now in Western Europe too.
The main head of Community expenditure, the CAP, has turned 
out on balance somewhat regressive. Although the regional 
and social funds have redistributive aspects, their effect 
is negligible because a large part of their outlays too are 
made in the richest countries, and anyway, they have little 
to spend, certainly not nearly enough to offset the cumulative
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divergence that takes place within any economic space. 
Moreover, the Community*s most notable economic initiative 
in recent years, the European Monetary System, could, like 
the gold standard, easily increase rather than reduce 
inequality, in the absence of policies to stop this happen­
ing. 1)
The political representatives of the Nine evidently see 
their role (and indeed their careers require them so to do) 
as one of safeguarding living standards and employment 
levels in their own countries, now under increasing threat, 
due to the precarious state of West European hegemony, 
against Community policy which might impinge on these.
So Community politics continues to consist of quibbles 
about which nation will gain what in the short term. At 
the time of writing, the Community's basic response to the 
problem posed by three poorer recruits seems to be: 'What
must we concede to them?', not 'What do they need to become 
fully integrated into the Community?' This is true even 
of the West German establishment, who have most to qain 
economically from increased access to new markets.2)
If however, the political will and leadership to assimilate 
Sicily have been lacking, why should we expect them to 
appear on the scale needed to develop most of Portugal, 
especially in a period when governments are dedicated to 
restrictive financial strategies? In concrete terms, even 
It there are no major changes in the Community, sacrifices 
will be required from many in the Nine whose jobs are 
anyway precarious (eg textile workers) or who rely on 
subsidies from the Community budget (wine producers, for 
example). Some of those currently benefiting from the 
regional and social funds would be affected because, even if 
these were considerably increased, entirely new operational 
criteria would have to be employed. We must expect comp­
etition for the Community's meagre financial resources 
between the Three and the poorer regions of the Nine.
Yet if there are no major reforms in the Community, there 
will be, after the enlargement, serious dualism, Indeed a 
sort of colonial system. In the poorer group which already 
suffers whenever a government of the core adopts financially 
restrictive policies, the effects could be more severe if 
they give up the possibility of adopting measures to protect 
the national economy. Wage levels would stay much lower 
than in the Nine, and the new members would continue to 
depend heavily, perhaps Increasingly, on tourism and labour 
migration. During the envisaged transition period, legal 
barriers will remain, but, ultimately, one result of a tWo 
tier community would presumably be an uncomfortably heavy 
migration towards West Germany and France. Another would 
be the increased likelihood of genuinely left-wing parties 
taking power after all, or only being prevented from doing 
so, as in the past, by right-wing repression - and neither
1. See the Introduction to "Integration and Unequal 
Development" op.clt,
2. See Chapter 3,
3. See the chapter by Carlo Secchl,
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process would necessarily stop at the Pyrenees. Lastly, 
Community business would become even more difficult to 
transact than at present, further impairing its capacity 
to deal with external challenges: the exact constitutional
arrangements for the enlarged Community have yet to be 
defined, but the new recruits will hardly lack ways of 
making known their needs if these are neglected. The 
EEC would not be the first Community to disintegrate.
The Requirements of True Integration
There is an alternative scenario, that of true integration. 
This would require capital to finance the reconstruction 
of the agricultural and Industrial sectors of the new 
members and a reformed fiscal system with a much larger
budget. Although the economic argument of the Prandt
Report, that it is in the interests of rich countries to 
help the development of the poorer, and that 'massive 
transfers' of funds would flow back to the donors in 
export orders stimulating their industries, is open to 
various political and economic objections (see Dudley Seers, 
'North-South: muddling morality and mutuality', Third
World Quarterly, October 1980), these are less cogent 
when the argument is applied inside Europe: here there
really are some 'mutual interests'.
A truly integrated Community, especially of twelve, would 
be able to develop further its role as a policy maker in 
industry. It could follow the logic of dear food and set 
limits to the penetration of European industrial sectors, 
without losing access to overseas markets or sources of 
supply. (Retaliation is less feasible, the larger the 
Community). Community regulation of industrial activity 
will surely be applied to an increasing number of industries, 
developing into a policy of increasing Community self- 
reliance, the logical counterpart of the self-reliance 
strategies, especially 'South-South' cooperation, or 
'collective self-reliance', which are increasingly (and 
understandably) being promoted in the rest of the world.
1. Because of this possibility, there lias been some talk 
of a formal junior category of membership with fewer 
responsibilities but also fewer rights (which lias 
indeed been considered also for Britain). But can 
political stability in the Mediterranean be bought
so cheaply?
2. A 'Marshall Plan" for the Mediterannean was adopted by 
the West German Social Democratic Tarty, though not 
the West German Social Democratic Government.
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Moreover, it would be desirable - if politically possible 
- to use such regulation to create some space for the 
expansion of industries, especially new ones, located in 
Southern Europe.
In a more homogenous Europe, the European Currency Unit 
could become the strongest of currencies, impervious 
(which it is not currently) to a dollar that fluctuates 
violently. Not merely much trade, but also considerable 
transactions for services would be internal. Then the ECU 
would provide the base for world trade as a currency of 
both account and settlement. Indeed the EMS could eventu­
ally develop some of the functions of a European Central 
Bank with its own reserves, capable of reinforcing Community 
economic policies, eg for recycling the OPEC surpluses.
Could such a Eurocentric scenario be combined with a 
constructive approach to relations with the 'Third World'?
It would not be hard to improve on past performance. Our 
contribution to overseas development since the war may well 
have been on balance negative, even since decolonisation.
The beneficial effects of aid have been outweighed in many 
cases by the consequences of political support, mentioned 
above, for governments that fit into a 'western' dominated 
world economy. In many of these (eg Zaire), populist 
regimes have been subverted and repressive and inegalitarian 
regimes established and supported. Much European capital 
and covert political support has also been extended to the 
government of South Africa, affecting the whole of the 
southern part of the continent.*
The impact varies of course, but in general high technology 
is injected into the 'modern'sector, aggravating geograph­
ical dualism and economic inequality.
A community of twelve would have less need for the resources 
of the Third World. It would of course be even more 
dependent on imported oil than the Nine, and, especially 
if most of the additional Western Hemisphere capacity is 
absorbed by the United States, it will be heavily dependent 
on the Middle East. But its very economic size, provided 
it develops fufther its capacity for united action, would
1. Banks and their subsidiaries in the EEC (more than 200 
altogether) lent a total of more than $10 billions'to 
South Africa in 1972-8 (Bank loans to South Africa 
1972-8, United Nations, 1979)
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help strengthen its bargaining power and facilitate agree­
ments with the oil producers of the Middle East that could 
cover guaranteed supplies at stable (indexed) prices in 
return for greater technological support and closer 
political cooperation.
In other respects, a bigger Community would be able to meet 
more of its own requirements (see Table 2) , thouqh still a 
big importer of key industrial materials, such as copper, 
wood, cotton and wool^, and there are considerable possib­
ilities of further mineral development in the Three.
Provided these are exploited, the customary interventions of 
its member governments in the political and economic affairs 
of other countries, which is certainly becoming less 
feasible, might seem less necessary. This could be much 
more important to the Third World than what happens to the 
volume of capital flows. It could in fact well be to 
everyone's benefit if the European TN E s , engaged in manufac­
turing and certain minerals, were induced to invest inside 
the Community, especially along its periphery, rather than 
outside it. Governments elsewhere are much less capable 
of protecting the national interest by rejecting socially 
undesirable projects put forward by the TNEs, or by 
controlling their operations (eg by checking 'transfer 
pricing'), or by ensuring that technology, of the right kind, 
is gained.
1. It would, for example, be able to supply more of its 
own needs of semi-tropical fruits and vegetables, such 
as citrus and tomatoes. What is a threat to parts of 
the Third World is an opportunity for Southern Europe. 
On the other hand the agricultural surpluses of the 
Nine could more easily be absorbed - provided, of 
course, the CAP is reformed so that enlargement does 
not lead to big increases in the Three in the produc­
tion of foodstuffs already in surplus, and the Three's 
income rises sufficiently. Capital flows to the new 
members would also help generate much-needed orders 
for the equipment industries in the present Community.
2. The Community would also be more self-sufficient in 
antimony, manganese, mercury and tungsten.
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Similarly, types of aid that have primarily political or 
commercial justifications (constituting a large fraction 
of the total) could also well be reduced, with advantage to 
both sides. The purpose of much aid at present is to 
gain political or commercial advantage over other European 
countries: if more were chanelled through the Community,
this motive would largely disappear. (Direct aid from 
OPEC sources, less politically or commercially oriented, 
could gradually take its place). Moreover, much technical 
assistance is now really superfluous - and some of it 
leads to inappropriate transfers of technique, damaging the 
recipients.
Perhaps the most constructive European policy in the 1980s 
would be increasingly to allow the countries of the Third 
World to solve their own development problems - in sharp 
contrast to the paternalistic self-interest of European 
Third World policy in the past three decades. One of the 
most significant implications of the second enlargement is 
that it permits, and may compel, a degree of disengagement. 
This would assist the 'delinking' now being increasingly 
espoused in the Third World. As a corollary, a more 
autonomous Western Europe could play a positive role in 
establishing a viable world economic order, with inter­
national taxation gradually taking the place of aid. If 
European TNEs invested less abroad, members of the EEC 
would be less intent on their defence in UNCTAD; indeed 
the Community would be more likely to develop an interest 
in monitoring the behaviour of TNEs based in the United 
States and Japan. Our continent could also if it solves 
its economic problems continue to provide academic liberties 
in research and teaching from which those in other parts of 
the world, where these are now rare, would also benefit, 
directly or indirectly.
Yet there is a big question mark about the internal found­
ations of the integrationist scenario. To what extent do 
people feel themselves 'Europeans', willing to transfer 
patriotic loyalties to European institutions (as most 
United States minorities have been prepared to accept 
assimilation)? This is already a fundamental question 
about the Community of Nine, and will be raised more 
acutely in one that is bigger. How it is answered in any 
Community is probably in the end a necessary condition of 
viability (though far from a sufficient one), and the larger 
and more heterogenous the group of countries, the more 
important it is.
r
An intuitive, but hardly controversial, reaction is that the 
sense of being a European does not seem, anywhere in the 
continent, nearly strong enough to carry a big political 
superstructure. We must not forget the linguistic frontiers 
which are more durable than customs barriers, nor the trad­
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itional enmities, eg between the British and the French.
A Briton, say, who goes 'to Europe' for his holiday, 
perceives contrasts not similarities, and may well take 
shelter in a group of compatriots on a package tour. Such 
cultural variety helps explain the strength of nationalist 
resistance to the policies that would integrate the 
Community.
A visitor from Africa or Asia is, however, likely to be 
struck by the similarities in life styles in Europe - 
brands of consumer goods, clothing fashions, architectural 
design, popular music and (by comparison with the rest of 
the world) values and attitudes, including a lingering 
belief in the rule of law. The ideologies of European 
Communists and Conservatives seem to us far apart, even 
within a country, but this contrast looks a good deal less 
striking when we turn to the values and attitudes of (say) 
Iranian mullahs or the cadres of the Khmer Rouge or 
Argentine generals or many of the African dictators.
Because of common legacies and experiences in Europe 
(covering the Three as well as the Nine) cultural differ­
ences are really quite marginal relative to those separating 
it from other continents.
Moreover, we should not fall into the trap of assuming that 
circumstances will, or even can, remain unchanged. 
(Economists have become accustomed to economic dynamics 
but often marry it to static political analysis). The 
factors that have increasingly produced Community policies 
and led the Community to act as a bargaining agent will 
continue to operate in the coming decades. Civil and 
international wars, especially in the Middle East, are 
likely to become more frequent. The interests of the 
United States and Western Europe seem unlikely to start 
converging: indeed political trends in the United States
seem bound to lead to growing friction. Moreover, there 
may well be more regimes like those of Idi Amin and Bokassa, 
and incidents in the Third World that thave shocked public 
opinion (like the assassinations of Europeans in Katanga) 
may grow more frequent. There will inevitably be some 
strengthening of the Commission's staffwork on external 
policy.
There will, no doubt, be more incidents in Western Europe 
itself like the riots of Iranian students and murders of 
exiles from Libya and the Middle East. Cooperation 
between EEC anti-terrorist agencies will continue to grow 
and must eventually lead to an agreement on extradition.
The competition of Japan and the NICs will predictably 
affect additional European industries. Overseas countries 
will be able to satisfy a growing fraction of their own
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industrial needs. The Community's need for inexpensive and 
secure supplies of energy is hardly likely to abate.
Joint action in defence of what will be seen as European 
interests in an increasingly insecure world must become more 
common. The need for such joint action would reinforce the 
case for redistributing economic power within the Community, 
so that it would present a united front to the outside world.
Jean Monnet and other progenitors of the Community might well 
even approve such development as the way to achieve in the 
1980s their ultimate aim - European peace, prosperity and 
independence. Such a Community would be, of course, less 
'liberal' than they envisaged, but one must allow for the 
likely effects on their thinking, too, of the events and 
trends of the past decade, especially the greatly increased 
strength of OPEC and the Iranian revolution. (The last 
quarter of this century is making mercantilists of us all - 
really the only question is what to protect: the nation or
the continent?).
The Possibilities of Further Enlargement
I would like in closing to offer some personal speculations 
about future patterns in Europe that arise out of 
the previous analysis. The Community's founders 
might now in fact be thinking on a still bigger scale, 
planning to maintain the momentum by following this stage 
of enlargement with others. Does not the basic politico- 
economic rationale of the Treaty of Rome, and of the first 
two enlargements, also apply mutatis mutandis to a still 
bigger Community?
An immediate issue is posed by the possible Turkish applic­
ation. The economic task of integrating Turkey into the 
Community would be formidable in view of social and economic 
standards in some provinces deep in Asia, compared to which 
even North Portugal seems highly developed. The popul­
ation size, more than 40 million, and the rate of popul­
ation growth, are by no means assets in view of these 
economic and social levels. Indeed, the task of truly 
integrating Turkey into the Community would be so great as 
to weaken the resolve to tackle the much more manageable 
absorption of Southern Europe. Moreover, Turkey raises 
more profound problems on the criteria of cultural traditions 
- not only from the linguistic angle. Political stability 
is precarious. The country is very different from the 
Nine in senses which the Three are not. The case for a 
positive response to a Turkish application would have to 
rest almost entirely on military grounds. r
But. there are other ways of tackling strategic vulnerability. 
The Community does not have to wait passively for the fund­
amental division in Europe itself to be eased. The most
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important task is still, as in the 1950s, to eliminate the 
danger of war. But the war would no longer be Franco- 
German: the obvious danger now is of a war between the
Soviet Union and the United States, with Europe as the 
battlefield. This prospect would become considerably less 
threatening if the countries of Eastern Europe were brought 
increasingly into a broader European economy.
An economic grouping on this scale - not necessarily taking 
the form of a mammoth Community - would naturally be much 
more independent of the United States, and could more 
easily protect distinctive European interests. Indeed 
without close affiliation to either power it could attract 
Austria and Finland too, and the governments of Norway 
and Sweden might, some time in the coming decades, find 
remaining outside a more united Europe unsafe - as might a 
future Labour government in Britain.
This would be a market of the size beyond the dreams of 
the founders of the EEC. It would have a combined product 
of $2,500 billion (1977 figures), against $1,900 bn for the 
United States and $740 bn for Japan. An economy of this 
size would be still more self-sufficient than one of a 
dozen (see Table 2), especially in iron ore, copper and 
wood. (The additional countries are ones which never 
became so dependent on colonial patterns of trade). here 
again, the potential for self-sufficiency would be yet 
greater if we allowed for the resources that could be 
developed.
Eastern Europe would, moreover, because of its unsuccessful 
farming record, provide a natural outlet for the agric­
ultural surpluses of the western countries. Its pent-up 
demand for meat, dairy products and wine is high, whereas 
it could help meet Western Europe's needs for maize. The 
demographic consequences would be similar to the second 
enlargement: the total population would be younger and more
dynamic as well as much larger.
A group coverning the whole continent would carry corres­
pondingly greater weight in international negotiations hnd 
could exercise a powerful influence for world peace by 
breaking the United States/Soviet polarity. Its interests 
in world stability would make it a better instrument than
1. Within Eastern Europe, only its industrial core, East 
Germany, shows demographic patterns like those of the 
Ni n e .
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OECD (or 'Group B' in UNCTAD), in which the United States is 
dominant, for working out a compact with the Third World.
Any enlargement of the EEC reduces, moreover, both the need 
and the temptation for its governments to intervene with aid 
programmes. If the European resource base were really big, 
many authoritarian Thira World regimes could be weakened.
If there were parallel political convergence in due course, 
starting with non-aggression pacts, both NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact would gradually become obsolete. Medium-range 
nuclear weapons could be eliminated. After all, neither 
Western nor Eastern Europe has aims identical with its 
patrons, nor any interest at all in being destroyed in the 
furtherance of such aims. Indeed much of the need for 
arms expenditure in both parts of Europe would vanish, 
although such a scenario presumably requires the revival, 
in a new form, of the European Defence Community to cope 
with external threats, and a greater self-sufficiency in 
some arms, notably military aircraft.
There are obvious difficulties. Would the ideological 
constraints not be too great? What would be the attitude 
in other countries to a Germany which was reunited - de 
facto if not de jure? Would not the Sov iet government 
veto such a development? Would the cultural heterogeneity 
not be too great?
Let us take these in turn. The economies of the EEC are 
being increasingly 'managed', despite the proclaimed 
ideology, whereas 'free' markets and decentralised decision 
making are spreading in the East, again whatever the pro­
claimed ideology, and these ultimately imply political 
changes that would in turn reinforce this trend. Other­
wise the internal contradictions of socialism seem unresol- 
vable. *
Integration in the real sense is slowly happening anyway.
The TNEs have been embarking on joint ventures in Eastern 
Europe, and West European (especially West German) brands 
are increasingly visible. The governments of COMECON have 
been borrowing heavily from the private banks of the West.
1. See, for example, S. Brucan, (Professor of International 
Relations at the University of Bucharest) "The strat­
egies of development in Eastern Europe' (IFDA Dossier 
13, 1979, Nyon), Apparently a conflict has grown up 
between the emerging socio-economic system and the old 
political system.
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Much West European currency Is circulating in Eastern Europe. 
Tourist and student exchanges grow, and there is now consid­
erable seasonal Polish labour working in West Germany.
Greater integration into Western Europe would undoubtedly 
have a growing popular appeal, especially if the Community 
developed proper mechanisms for social development and used 
them in Southern Europe.
Certainly formal affiliation poses great difficulties. But 
this is not really the issue. The early relations between 
the Nine and each of the Three consisted of specially 
tailored agreements, which ran for years before the latter 
applied in turn for membership; meanwhile the economic 
logic of integration continued to operate. That could 
also be the pattern for developing relationships with the 
governments of Eastern Europe, as is already happening 
with Yugoslavia. Various stages of association are 
possible, short of full membership but involving closer 
economic and political links and permitting, eg access to 
the European Investment Bank. Such stages miqht well last 
for some time. Eventually a government might apply for 
formal membership and be followed by others, one at a time. 
Anyway, the Community could hardly face a big further 
enlargement until it has digested Southern Europe, which 
must take a decade at the least.
Relations between the Germanies in particular are surely 
going to continue their gradual convergence, even if there 
are temporary setbacks, and despite the likelihood that 
reunification is still some decades away. Not merely are 
there strong cultural ties between East and West Germany: 
consumption levels and styles are less dissimilar between 
them than within either Western or Eastern Europe. There 
would indeed be a certain logic in a German economy as the 
geographical hub of an integrated Europe, with |ts internal 
trade stimulated by the new Rhine/Danube Canal. This 
development might not appear such a political threat to 
neighbouring countries, provided adequate mechanisms had 
by then been created for spreading the profits of the core, 
and also truly democratic controls, especially a consid-
1. The Nazis' plan for a 'New Order' was politically
unacceptable to the people of other European countries 
and the attempt to impose it by force not merely 
immoral but inefficient: still, economically, it had
a certain rationale.
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erable strengthening of the European Parliament. The 
second enlargement might turn out to have the additional 
historical justification of compelling the Community to 
remove institutional obstacles to its further expansion.
No doubt the Soviet government would view such a suggestion 
with anxiety, but it is clearly not completely in control 
of developments in Eastern Europe. It cannot provide the 
capital, technology and markets these countries need to 
meet consumer aspirations (now, not even all the oil they 
require). If integration is gradual, the costs of inter­
vening, especially by military action, to stop any partic­
ular step might well appear to the Soviet government too 
high. (The basic arguments that must have persuaded 
Stalin of the dangers of trying to make these countries 
part of the Soviet Union, like the Baltic States, would 
still seem cogent). Besides, a neutral bloc to the South- 
West, which the Soviet government might see as a partial 
'Finlandisation' of the continent, would permit a greater 
concentration of Soviet military power along the lengthy 
frontier with China.
Certainly the affiliation of Northern and Eastern Europe 
would increase the Community's cultural diversity. But 
cultural patterns in all the countries concerned show 
certain similarities, reflecting common religious origins 
(whatever the official attitudes to these), not to speak of 
the common membership several of them once shared in the 
kingdoms of Central Europe -none of which is true of 
Turkey (unless one counts its former domination of the 
Balkans).
To sum up, an expanding Community, with growing internal 
homogeneity, self-sufficiency and bargaining power, provides 
one coherent answer to the historic challenge which the loss 
of empire has posed for Europeans. In this way welfare 
services and political democracy could survive the coming
1. The status of this at present reminds one of that of 
the English Parliament under Charles I - until he 
needed his budgets approved.
2. Is it anyway quite inconceivable that political r 
developments within the Soviet Union will ultimately 
lead to links between the Community and the European 
Soviet Republics?
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decades without any colonial or neo-colonial system. Hut 
its political feasibility depends on whether the necessary 
leadership and a sense of European identity, which are still 
notably absent, are summoned into being by the deepening 
world crisis.
TABLE 1 Average rates of unemployment and changes in retail prices in the Nine,1971-80























1 Percentages of economically active civilian population.
2 Change from previous year.
3 Based on data for June.
Sources: Basic Statistics of the Community, EUROSTAT, EUROPE, 28 July 1980.





($ b n .)
Iron ore Copper ore Roundwood lintcotton
Greasy
wool
The Nine 260 1,629 29 1 89 0 23
The Twelve 314 1,792 30 8 90 15 29
Europe
(excluding USSR)
479 2,504 41 45 95 10 39
1 Production as percent of apparent consumption
2 1978.
Sources: World Bank Atlas, Washington, 1979
FAO Production and Trade Year Bo o k , Rome, 1978 
World Mineral Statistics, London, 1979
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